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Abstract 
This essay uses examines contemporary Ethiopian philosophy to determine the practicality 
of sage philosophy and 'its connections to rationality and science. The early Messay 
. Kebede, former chair of the University of Addis Ababa philosophy department, views 
philosophy as an aid to science-any other use of philosophy is myth. The later Messay 
valorizes myth as a force serving rationality. After criticizing Messay's separation of myth 
and rationality, the essay considers his proposals for philosophy in Africa. Claude 
Sumner's' (another former Addis Ababa philosophy chair) research on oral Ethiopian 
traditions offers an alternative to Messay, but Sumner's method can be augmented by 
Odera Oruka's. After considering Ethiopian anthropologist Gemetchu Megerssa's research 
on Oromo worldviews, the conclusion proposes a research program using the combined 
methods of anthropologists and philosophers to develop a philosophical "galvanizing 
myth" emerging from African history to stand against globalization. 
Introduction 
" ... all of Africa and its numerous inhabitants, as remarkable in character as they 
are in color, still remain to be studied; the whole earth is covered with Nations 
of which we know only the names, and yet we pretend to judge mankind!" 
Rousseau, First Discourse 
"Don't Think. Look." Wittgenstein, Blue Book 
This essay uses contemporary philosophy in Ethiopia as a case study to examine the 
practical status of sage philosophy and its connections to rationality and science. Centering 
on the rich history of research produced in Addis Ababa University's philosophy 
department, the essay commences with Messay Kebede's views on these issues. A former 
chair of the department, he now serves on the philosophy faculty at the University of 
Dayton in Ohio. Messay's position has changed markedly over time. (The essay follows 
the Ethiopian custom of referring to a person by given name rather than patronymic.) A 
survey of his research illustrates a remarkable correlation between philosophy and culture. 
His early research views philosophy as an aid only to science - any other use of philosophy 
is myth. His later research valorizes myth as a galvanizing force in the service of 
rationality. 
The essay's second section criticizes Messay's radical separation of myth and rationality. If 
rationality is the process of setting and achieving goals through reason, feeling and 
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imagination, then philosophy's task within rationality is to furnish the foundational goals 
that direct our lives and to revise those goals when necessary. Philosophy and science are 
both integral parts of rationality's whole. They are separable only by their degrees of 
generalization. At its cutting edge, science is philosophy. But philosophy aims at such 
heights of generalization that its directives are not subject to verification. Hence 
philosophical guidelines have the character of myth, in the original Greek sense of muthos, 
a likely or plausible story. This section's conclusion considers whether myths can be 
separated from one another by their degree of plausibility. 
The essay's third section considers Messay's proposals for the conduct of philosophy 
in Africa. Rejecting the methods of African philosophers such as Hountondji, Mudimbe, 
Appiah, and Wiredu, Messay turns to Hemi Bergson, the subject of his Ph.D. dissertation 
at Grenoble, for inspiration. With Bergson, Messay claims that "galvanizing" myths must 
drive rationality in appropriate directions. One role of such myths is to ensure that 
rationality is not given undue emphasis. Messay turns to a "deracialized" Negritude and 
Afrocentrism (from Leopold Senghor and Cheikh Anta Diop) for a syncretic galvanizing 
myth appropriate to Africa's current circumstances. 
After criticizing Messay's methods for generating viable myths for Africa, the essay's 
fourth section turns to Claude Sumner's research on literate and oral philosophical 
traditions in Ethiopia. Sumner's methodology moves from external influences on Ethiopian 
written philosophy (Indian, Persian, Arabian, Greek, for example) to the world views of the 
indigenous Oromo cultures in Southern, Eastem, and Western Ethiopia. 
Sumner characterizes his research as "sapiential literature" (Sumner 1995:23) rather than 
sage philosophy in the sense of Odera Oruka (1997), whose method relies on dialogical 
interviews. Sumner's virtue is to employ the services of anthropologists and linguists in 
producing his wisdom literature. The conclusion of this section proposes a conflation of 
Sumner and Oruka's methods that requires collaboration between anthropologists and 
philosophers. 
The essay's conclusion proposes a research program that synthesizes the work of 
Addis Ababa University anthropologist Gemetchu Megerssa and Sumner. Gemetchu argues 
that Oromo culture derives from an earlier Cushitic culture that su:etched from Afi'ica to 
India three thousand years ago, with connections to Ancient Egyptian culture (Gemetchu 
1995: 11-12; Kassam 1995: 10). His hypothesis suggests possible links between Oromo 
and ancient Egyptian philosophy. Sumner's research can be used to compare the 1 ih 
century Ethiopian philosopher Zar'a Ya'qob to Northern African philosophers like the 
Egyptian Valentinus. Valentinus' gnosticism borrows heavily from ancient Egyptian 
cosmology. Oromo worldviews as presented by Gemetchu are holistic, as is the cosmology 
of ancient Egypt. 
Coupling sage philosophy in numerous African cultures to literate philosophy in 
Ethiopia (Sumner's translations), Mali (the Timbuktu texts), and other African countries 
would be an arduous research program. But such a program might be the best chance for 
developing a holistic "galvanizing myth" that emerges from African history to stand 
against globalization. 
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Messay on Philosophy and Science, Myth and Rationality 
The most widely known modem Ethiopian philosopher is Zar'a Ya'qob. His short Hatata 
(translated as 'inquiry' or 'treatise,' but derived from a Ge'ez expression meaning to rub or 
grind into small pieces) is widely circulated in introductory philosophy anthologies. He is 
roughly contemporaneous with Descartes, and their methods are strikingly similar. Both 
break down their topics into small parts and both rely on the light of reason to guide their 
investigations. Both use reason to establish the existence of God. Zar'a Ya'qob goes so far 
as to claim that reason alone can give us access to God-scriptures including the Bible and 
Koran contain much that is false in the light of reason. What is natural is what God 
prescribes-eating, procreation, monogamy, freedom, love. What is unnatural is prescribed 
by man and propagated thmugh scripture-fasting, abstention from sex, polygamy, slavery, 
hatred. All men, says Zar'a Ya'qob, are liars, and men write scriptures (Zar'a Ya'qob in 
Sumner, 1 976: 1 3) .  
According to Claude Sumner, the discoverer of  the Hatata, Zar'a Ya'qob goes so far 
as to excise key elements of Christian scripture through his hatata-the Holy Trinity, Jesus 
Christ, Incarnation, Redemption or Resurrection, the Mother of Christ, the Church, liturgy 
or sacraments (Sumner quoted in Messay, 1 988 : 1 20). Zar'a Ya'qob exemplifies a 
philosophy of religion so corrosive that it matches 1 9th century European and American 
deism like that of Thomas Jefferson. 
Astoundingly, Messay claims that Zar'a Ya'qob is not a philosopher. With Sumner, 
Messay admires Zar'a Ya'qob as an "architect of unity" (Sumner quoted in Messay, 
ibid. :78). He viewed all religions as worshipping the same God. Like Descartes, he 
employs a method of doubt that is resolved only through the light of reason. But unlike 
Descartes, Zar'a Ya'qob doubts in order to establish "the authentic religion" that brings 
"peace and love among men" (Messay, 1 988:84). 
Messay's dogmatism on his rejection of Zar'a Ya'qob as a philosopher is curious. 
Zar'a Ya'qob's philosophy of religion is unique in the Ethiopia of his time, to say nothing 
of the wider world. His originality has precipitated Italian claims that the Hatata must 
have been written by an Italian missionary because it is so uncharacteristic of conventional 
Ethiopian thought of the 1 7th century (Sumner 1 976:6 1 -275). 
Messay's claim follows from his definition of philosophy. The whole point of Western 
philosophy, and "most probably the essence of philosophy in general" is to "explain and 
establish the possibility of scientific knowledge" (Messay, 1 98 8:85). Messay does not 
single out Zar'a Ya'qob for exclusion. Banished from philosophy with him are Pascal and 
Kierkegaard "who refused to confront faith with science," who insisted that religious belief 
is outside the purview of science (ibid.:86). Unlike these philosophers, however, Zar'a 
Ya'qob was "not even aware of the existence of a scientific knowledge" (ibid.). Writing in 
1 988,  Messay does not address the claims of Paul Feyerabend ( 1 975) and Thomas Kuhn 
( 1 970) that science itself is gmunded in faith-the faith, for example, that science is worth 
pursuing, that technology associated with science will not destroy life on earth, and that 
one research program is more worth pursuing than another. 
The key to Messay's rejection of Zar'a Ya'qob as a philosopher lies in his explanation 
as to why Zar'a Ya'qob could not have developed a philosophy. While Zar'a Ya'qob 
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"contained all the seeds of philosophical thinking," these could not sprout "because of the 
negative pressure of the social forces" (ibid.: 127). Only Marxism can "plant the seed" that 
will remove the "hampering features of the traditional culture" (ibid.:148). Philosophy's 
proper task is to "reflect on a culture in order to revolutionize it" (ibid. : 144). Philosophy 
accomplishes this task as an adjutant to rationality. Theories are rational to the degree that 
they are explanatory. But explanations . are rational only if their language is scientific: 
"When the explanatory language takes the form of scientific language and refers to 
scientific arguments we have properly philosophy." Any explanation that doesn't take its 
force from "secular references" is "mythology or religion" (ibid. : 128). In separating 
religion and mythology from rationality, Messay reduces philosophy to science. He is in 
good company, even outside the ambit of Marxism. The American philosopher Willard 
Quine (1977; see Verharen 1996) views philosophy as simply the most general part of 
science. The Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (200111922) sees the philosopher 
as a warden making sure that philosophers do not attempt to do anything other than 
science. 
Messay's remarks on the relations of philosophy, science and myth arc presented in 
the context of an Ethiopian culture dominated by Marxism. His position changes 
dramatically after the fall of the Soviet Union. In Ethiopia under the influence of the Derg, 
philosophy's task is to hasten the revolution. For Messay writing in the United States, 
philosophy brokers a marriage between myth and rationality to guide Africa on the path to 
decolonization. 
A myth for the "new" Messay is not the product of pure imagination careless of its 
connections to experience. On the other hand a myth docs not convey knowledge in any 
empirical sense. Messay takes his definition from Hemi Bergson. The "myth-making 
[unction" of the rnind develops concepts "that counterfeit reality as actually perceived, to 
the point of making us act accordingly" (Bergson quoted in Messay, 2004: 143). The point 
of a myth is to drive action. Religious myths illustrate Bergson's point. The corrosive 
power of thought presents us with "the inevitability of death, the appearance of selfishness 
in a being designed for social life, and the uncertainty of projected actions in a mechanical 
uncertain world" (ibid. :214) . Religious myth thwarts those irresistible claims o-f rationality 
with the conviction that our real lives start after death where selfishness will be punished 
and altruism rewarded. Faith in God's love protects us from an unfriendly world. Myth 
overcomes the dispiriting claims of rationality. 
To have the power to direct action in the face of overwhelming odds, a myth is most 
forcefully presented as evolving from and continuing a venerable historical tradition. 
Neither flights of pure fancy nor scientific explanations evoke the power of myth. Myths 
are conveyed as the stories we tell ourselves to motivate us to action. The most powerful 
myths are those that command the will of whole nations. And a nation's "capacity to tell a 
story determines the degree to which a nation controls its destiny" (ibid.: 146). 
Messay's research in his Aji-ica 's Quest for a Philosophy of Decolonizatiol1 is a search 
for a grounding myth, an ur-myth, that will allow the whole African continent to control its 
destiny. As we shall see in the essay's third section, Messay paints Leopold Senghor's 
Negritude and Cheikh Anta Diop's Afrocentrism as myth-making efforts that must fail by 
reason of their racializing characteristics. The African struggle against the effects of 
16 
EJOSSAH Vol. IV, No. 1 July 2006 
colonization is difficult, in part because of the European imposition of a "cult of 
rationality" on Africans. This cult, itself a myth, imposed science as a standard of 
rationality and thereby robbed Africans of their "power to believe" (ibid. :219) . Senghor 
hoped to restore that power by disparaging European rationality. Diop's restoration claimed 
that black Africa gave birth to European rationality. 
Messay opposes myth to rationality. I have not found an explicit definition of 
rationality in his research, but it is clear that the model of rationality is science as a 
synthesis of experience arid reasoning. Myth and science live together in the modem world 
but they clash with one another. Messay quotes Bergson: "experience may indeed say 'that 
is false,' and reasoning [may say] 'that is absurd.' Humanity only clings all the more to that 
absurdity and that elTor" (ibid. :213). Nevertheless, myth and rationality cannot live without 
each other. Messay claims that "rationality always teams up with myth" and that "mythical 
thinking is coextensive with rationality" (ibid. : 151). Neveliheless the two forces must 
achieve a delicate balance: "excessive valorization of rationality results in the complete 
asphyxiation of the power of the mind." The "myth-making function" must retain its 
autonomy to achieve its "empowering purpose" (ibid. : 212). What I question is Messay 's 
separation of myth from rationality. In the next section I propose a holistic definition of 
rationality that includes both functions. 
A C ritique of Messay's Separation of Myth and Rationality 
Messay's elTor is to separate myth and rationality. He goes so far as to say that "myth is 
not knowledge" (ibid. :213) .  He invokes Kwasi Wiredu' s  support in claiming that "even in 
the contemporary world, mythical representations resist the impact of rationality" (ibid. ) .  
Rather than defining myth as the product of  imagination disconnected from science, I 
regard it as muthos, a "likely story" in the original Greek. We deploy our myths in this 
sense when we've reached the limits of knowledge, when we're not sure of how to go on 
with what we're doing, when we must go on regardless and we must seize upon uncertain 
guidelines for our direction. Myth-making is integral to rationality as its founding and 
guiding principles. 
Under the influence of Bergson, Messay supposes that "myth confers a transcendent 
meaning on existence with the consequence that rationality is used as a device for going 
after the promised transcendence" (ibid. :xi). To see that myth need not "confer a 
transcendent meaning on existence," one need only consult Messay's original mentor, Karl 
Marx, who insisted that his own particular myth of freedom as the engine of human history 
could in no way be transcendent. Rationality must have a goal and that goal need be no 
more transcendent than securing air, water, food, or shelter. 
Rationality is our genetically endowed capacity to select and calTY out our goals. 
Before rationality became self-conscious or reflexive, goal selection and execution were 
automated processes. Goals unencumbered by myths for humanity-as for other 
mammals-were survival and flourishing, set within the limits of the environment. 
Because our large brains have given us the capacity for massive abstraction and 
imagination, we can now change the environment to suit our goals in ways that other 
animals do not. Our rationality now includes not only goal selection but the capacity to 
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alter "naturally ordained" goals through rationality's reflexive function. Rather than being 
the instruments of a natural selection oriented toward survival, humans can now chose 
liberty over life or love over self-interest: in the often-quoted words of Patrick Henry, 
"Give me liberty or give me death!" 
Not only our means for reaching goals but the goals themselves are subjected to 
rationality's critical gaze. Marx's peculiar myth was to imagine that humans are inexorably 
driven toward freedom as the highest, most human expression of survival and flourishing. 
He could not imagine that humans as a species could choose extinction-against nature 's 
own dictates. 
Marx's corollary myth, still shared by Messay, was that science is perfectly modeled 
in it;; European expressions. Like language (see Chomsky 2000) and morality (see Hauser 
2006), rationality is genetically endowed. As every human is capable of speech and moral 
behavior, so every human being is capable of expressing rationality in the form of science. 
Here I use science in the sense of abstracting from experience to form guiding 
generalizations. (Experience includes mental as well as sensory phenomena-even the 
most theoretical mathematics is, after all, an experience.) As those generalizations begin to 
conform more precisely to the constraints of rationality itself, science begins to take on its 
modern mathematical form. 
. 
Rationality's constraints follow from its evolutionary function. The complex brain and 
its capacity for imagination and abstract thought augment our capacity for survival. A brain 
that can map selected patterns in its environment and base its behavior on those patterns 
has a better chance of survival than an organism that reacts "blindly" to its circumstances 
through chemical signals or purely automated stimulus-response mechanisms. We move 
from a handful of humans in the "African Eve" era some 200,000 years ago to over six 
billion strong today. 
Humans are gifted with the ability to externalize their mapping functions through the 
use of symbols. Symbols express their own survival capacities by triggering emotional 
responses that move us to replicate them-the memetic process. Symbols have emotional 
as well as semantic and syntactic meaning. We select symbol sets, theories, in part by 
reason of their capacity accurately to reflect our experience. Symbols capture our "con­
cepts," literally our "grabbings together" of the patterns extracted from the environment 
through sensory "per-ceptions," literally "grabbings through." The connectedness of 
symbols to one another and to our experience is a condition for rationality as the complete 
expression of the human ability to draw connections. The use of symbols to connect 
abstract concepts with lived experience accurately is another condition for rationality. 
Following Kant's  example I would like to enumerate a complete set of conditions for 
rationality (see Messay 2004:146). Kant was on the right track in searching for the 
conditions of the possibility of "ob-jective" (literally, thrown toward) experience in the 
frameworks of space and time and the categories of causality and the like. Because my 
reflections are based on evolutionary theory rather than Kantian apodictic certainty, I look 
for the techniques we use to refme our approaches toward our goals. Rather than setting 
conditions for rationality, I look for the promptings we use to adjust our ways of achieving 
and revising our goals. 
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Like Marx and Darwin before him, I assume that evolution bequeathed us "natural" 
goals of surviving and flourishing. Our contemporary era with its potential for nuclear and 
environmental catastrophe shows that rationality has the capacity to subvert such goals. 
Nevertheless the rational methods we use to achieve our goals have so far not been 
subverted. We are prompted to ensure the emotive, semantic, and syntactic force of the 
symbols we use to "re-present" experience (the first presentation was through the senses). 
From Socrates'  persistent efforts to clarify the meanings of key abstract terms like good 
and justice, to Wittgens&in's insistence that philosophy is clarification, specifying the 
nature and limits of meaning has been philosophy's preoccupation. The reason flows from 
the very nature of "sym-bols," literally "throwings together. " Symbols acquire their 
meanings through (initial) acts of choice. The nature and limits of choices of symbols must 
be continually reviewed. 
A second prompting flows from the need to re-present experience accurately. This 
prompting is enshrined in the correspondence theory of truth. Empiricism's importance in 
the history of philosophy is a reflection of the experiential aspect of rationality. 
A third prompting insists that theoretical systems for re-presentation cannot offer "contra­
dictory" (speaking against themselves) representations of experience. The coherence theory 
of truth has captured this tactic of rationality. Rationalism' s role in the history of 
philosophy expresses the importance of this prompting, especially visible in Leibniz's 
proposal for a "universal calculus." 
A fourth prompting reminds us of the practical function of rationality: we think for a 
purpose, and theories that cannot accomplish their purposes cause us to rethink them. This 
prompting is expressed in the pragmatic theory of truth. The pragmatism of American 
philosophy has cross-cultural roots that extend to philosophy's earliest manifestations in 
Greek (Stoicism, hedonism), Indian (Buddhism in particular) and Ancient Egyptian 
philosophy (with its emphasis on Maat 's regulative role in human conduct). 
A fifth prompting suggests that those theories are best that cover the widest range of 
experience. Aristotle's conviction that the philosopher knows all things is an early 
manifestation of this aspect of rationality. Hegel's dictum, "the truth is the whole," 
captures this prompting perfectly. A contemporary expression is the attempt of string 
theorists in physics to encapsulate the laws for the four known forces into a single super­
law. Like Marx, Einstein hoped that scientific generalizations could capture both natural 
and human phenomena without discrimination. 
A sixth prompting is simply a measure of the abstractness of a theory. The fewer 
symbols required for a theory's representation of experience, the more abstract the theory. 
Rationality's power lies in its abstractive capacity. Einstein's E=mc:! ranges over the whole 
universe with its perfect simplicity in both theoretical and practical ways. All 
mathematically inclined philosophers like Pythagoras, Plato, Leibniz, and HusserI have 
emphasized this aspect of rationality. Simplicity was the guiding rule of the first 
philosophy we have access to. The ancient Egyptians reduced all reality to the chaotic 
primordial water-Nun. And contemporary scientists in their capacity as philosophers 
have followed an analogous model in reducing the complexity of the universe to the 
simplicity of the hydrogen atom in the Big Bang. 
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The seventh and final prompting springs from rationality's reflexive capacity. 
Socrates' insistence that he knew only that he did not know is European philosophy's most 
famous expression of this aspect of rationality. Theories as systems for re-presenting 
experience change dramatically because of experience's  resistance to theory's  constraints 
("essentialising" in postrnodem jargon) and because of our imagination's inexhaustible 
nature. 
Philosophy is a primary locus of rationality's imaginative powers. Rationality starts 
with a goal, and philosophy supplies the goals that justify all other goals. Because ultimate 
goals that justify concatenations of lesser goals cannot themselves be justified, 
philosophical goals have the character of likely stories or myths. Not knowing the origins 
of universe or the purpose of life, for example, we can choose to live within the bounds of 
ignorance. If we restrict ourselves to scientific knowledge, we cannot explain the origins of 
the hydrogen atoms that made the Big Bang possible. But the acceptance of that ignorance 
is a choice that competes with other choices-God as an explanation of atoms' origins, for 
example. The eternal existence of hydrogen atoms (or their equivalent in energy) or the 
eternal existence of a force beyond our comprehension that generates hydrogen atoms are 
both likely stories, myths. 
Rationality starts with a myth. Philosophy's task is to imagine that myth and to find 
compelling reasons to pursue the myth. If the myth and its subsets produce compelling 
results within rationality's constraints, it becomes difficult to modify or dislodge it. The 
alteration or destruction of a foundational, guiding myth is also philosophy's task. 
Dislodging myths takes place even within the contexts of well-established scientific 
theories. Einstein replaces Newton's foundational principles (Euclidian geometry, infinite 
universe, rectilinear unimpeded motion, gravitational action at a distance) with his own 
(Riemannian geometry, finite unbounded universe, curvilinear motion and space). Both 
practice a version of a "scientific method," namely a mathematization of experience. Both 
accept the likely story that engaging in this activity is a worthy endeavor. But unanimity on 
this'ur-myth yields to downstream disagreement. 
A greater imaginative gulf separates Newton and Einstein from Aristotle. Consider 
the distance between Aristotle's ideas that falling objects long for their resting place and 
that the soul "animates" the living organism and contemporary Newtonian and Einsteinian 
mechanics and Darwinian-based genetics. Is Aristotle more mythical, more philosophical 
than contemporary hard-nosed scientists? A myth is just that, a likely story. All likely 
stories are grounded in the conviction that they point out directions worth pursuing. A 
story like contemporary science may end with the termination of our capacity to tell stories, 
should current geo-politics yield a nuclear weapons exchange capable of producing nuclear 
winter. How likely a story is that! 
We can't reject even the most apparently preposterous myths out of hand. Examples 
abound in the history of science. Newton shocked classical sensibilities with his proposal 
that the heavenly and the earthly follow the same basie laws. Darwin's likely story about 
the unified origins of humans and animals still has an almost universal shock capacity. 
Marx's likely story is that humans must follow the as yet undiscovered natural laws that 
govern the whole universe. A shocking myth to those whose spiritual sensibilities insist on 
human freedom from nature's constraints. 
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Examples are easier to frod in the history of philosophy. Witness the pre-Socratic 
madness, as it must have appeared to Greeks accustomed to supernatural explanations 
rather than generalized descriptions of natural phenomena. Consider the Christian 
imperative of universal, unconditional love-an apparent transgression of all our natural 
instincts for survival and flourishing. Think of how unnatural Hindu and Buddhist 
meditation must appear to cultures bent on manipulation of the whole earth environment. 
If we grant that likely stories are an integral part of a scientific expression of 
rationality, is there any rigid way to judge a myth's  quality of rationality? Let us postulate 
as an hypothesis (a likely story!) that rationality is a function of connectivity. The 
rationality of a myth as a likely story can be measured by the numbers and kinds of 
connections that issue from its guiding principles. Einstein and Copernicus supersede 
Newton and Ptolemy not because we can be sure that their myths, their radical assumptions 
that direct their connective efforts, are true in any sense of that term. Relativity and 
heliocentrism merely satisfy rationality's  promptings in greater degree. Both Einstein and 
Newton allow us to navigate the whole universe with their theories. B y  this measure, 
scope, their theories are superior to those of Kepler, Galileo and Ptolemy whose theories 
restricted us to the local "heavens" or the earth. Nevertheless, Ptolemy'S assumptions still 
serve as a foundation for modern celestial navigation. 
Thomas Kuhn's work showed how heliocentrism was more rational than geocentrism 
(before our ability to detect celestial parallax) because of its simplicity, its use of fewer 
symbols to cover planetary, lunar, and perceived solar motion. Confronted with a failure to 
find experimental confirmation of one of his theories, Einstein affirmed his support for his 
theory because of its simplicity, economy, or "beauty" (subsequent experiments proved 
him correct). Newtonian mechanics are still accurate for purposes of space ballistics, but 
Einstein's relativity is more accurate for greater velocities and masses. 
Consider the likely story that malaria is caused by "bad air" (the etymology of mal-aria). 
Such a story might be as practical as a theory of bacterial transmission by the anopheles 
mosquito. Draining a swamp to get rid of the bad air would stop malaria. But the anopheles 
theory unfolds into a greater range of experience more accurately. The likely story that 
malaria is caused by "bad air" comes to a full stop rather quickly. Pursuit of the detailed 
nature of "bad air" would be as fruitless as the quest for the "caloric," the mysterious cause 
of heat propagation. 
Perhaps the most important measure of the rationality of a likely story is whether the 
story encodes instructions for "knowing how to go on," in Wittgenstein's felicitous phrase. 
A theory that enfolds itself in other theories, that advances a tradition, that provokes us to 
call itself into question, is a fruitful or stimulating theory. 
Even the measures of rationality can themselves be called into question through 
metatheoretical investigation. Consistency is one of the bedrock postulates of rationality. 
"Do I contradict myself? I contain multitudes ! "  This phrase may be a fine poetic sentiment. 
But non-contradiction has achieved the status as one of the "laws of thought" for Wiredu 
(1996), and it is enshrined as a "theory of truth." Nevertheless, quantum mechanics has 
called forth "quantum logic," a multi-valued logic used to address Heisenberg 's uncertainty 
principle. Einstein' s destruction of our common sense notions of the fixity of mass, length 
and time does not compare to quantum mechanic 's assault on consistency as a primary root 
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of rationality. The principle is so intuitively self-evident: To reason is to connect. Let us 
not imagine that what we have claimed to be connected is in the same sense and at the 
same time disconnected. 
What hope have we, then, of separating rational from irrational myths? "Purely" 
mythological symbol systems yield low rates of connectivity-even within "highly" 
rational systems like science. The symbol gravity, for example, has taken on quite 
different "life forms" in the history of modern science. Gravity used as an abstract term to 
refer to the entire field of gravitational phenomena exhibits a high degree of connectivity. 
Gravity used as a term to refer to the mysterious force acting at a distance to explain 
gravitational phenomena has only emotional rather than semantic connectivity. We simply 
don't know why mass behaves in gravitational ways-though our generalizations for 
describing these ways are quite useful. 
Newton prudently avoided any speculation about this mysterious force acting at a 
distance across the vacuum of space. In his famous words, "hypotheses non Jingo "-I don't 
make up stories. (Of course he made up the story that he should not make up stories--a 
perfect illustration of the emotive, reflexive and directive force of foundational myths, 
likely stories.) The bolder Descartes replaced Newton's vacuum of space with a plenum of 
"etherial" matter, and explained gravitational attraction as the result of vortices in this 
medium. Einstein like Newton had a horror of action at a distance, but Michelson and 
Morley could find no evidence of a Cartesian "aether." Consequently, Einstein claimed that 
the curvature of space in the presence of mass "explains" gravitational phenomena. 
Were the likely stories, the ur-hypotheses of Newton, Descaltes and Einstein rational? 
Their uses of the symbol gravity propelled centuries of investigation that has not so far 
proven fruitful. A recent hypothesis is that gravitational force is carried by "gravitons," 
waves or particles like photons. To date, no gravity wave detectors have yielded 
uncontroversial results . 
. Einstein's efforts to explain gravitational phenomena by warping space are analogous 
to earlier attempts to explain heating. The mysterious substance, the caloric. had little 
connectivity. This likely story spurred investigation into the nature of the ca19ric. But the 
term lost its emotive and semantic force when heat was described as the motion of 
molecules, "mean kinetic energy." The explanatory force of mysterious substances like 
heat or gravity vanishes in a sea of generalized descriptions, the massive cOlmectivity of 
contemporary science. 
Ruminations on gravity lead to questions about the rationality of God as the 
explanation of all explanations. Are uses of such a term "purely" mythical, as Richard 
Dawkins ' The God Delusion proposes? The term God generates powerful emotive 
connections. There may be a direct correlation between the abstractness of a term and its 
emotive force. However, the semantic connectivity of God has more the character of 
syntactic connections. The likely stories clustered around God derive their force from the 
biographical details of God, generated by cultures over the ages. To date, the stories do not 
have semantic force outside of themselves, except for believers who subscribe to "divine 
interventions" in the form of divine responses to prayers, miracles and the like. 
Are likely stories about God rational? Their persistence and power might be explained 
by our natural conditioning to refuse to accept states of ignorance on important issues and 
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to refuse to accept the fact of death as a permanent condition: "There are no atheists in the 
foxholes." We create hope in the hopeless situation with religious connectivity. Richard 
Dawkins ' protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, many of us are reluctant to 
"abandon all hope." 
Given the tortured and brief quality of the history of thought, assessing rationality is a 
task best undertaken with great diffidence. So many of our cherished likely stories in the 
past five thousand years ,have been exposed as irrational in some fundamental way that 
perhaps the best likely story is Socrates ' :  we can only be certain of our uncertainty. Most 
provocative are the claims of some religious stories to produce extraordinary cOImectivity. 
The (in)famous guru of the Beatles, Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, promises to make a science 
out of meditation, to teach his disciples to fly without mechanical means, to bring world 
peace about through a critical mass of disciples meditating in one geographic location. 
Preposterous? Irrational? Purely mythical? 
Paul Feyerabend's claim in his own (in)famous Against Method is that "anything 
goes." All myths have equal stature in the face of our abyssal ignorance, and science is one 
myth among many. More seductive than many other myths, contemporary science delivers 
massive control of the environment. Exercising such control without a full understanding 
of its consequences requires abundant optimism or massive pessimism: "It will come out 
all right in the end-Gaia will take care of us even if we mess up," or "It doesn't really 
matter what we do sinee we're all going to die anyway-what difference does it make if all 
of us die all at once? Think of the untold misery those unborn billions will have escaped !" 
Science guarantees results. How could science be mythical? The myth of science is  that 
science is worth pursuing. Humans wonder, as Aristotle said, as the sparks fly up. Science 
is irresistible. How could anyone doubt that science is worth pursuing? And given the 
progress in the history of science, how could anyone question the rationality of our 
contemporary pursuit of science? 
How to pursue science is one question. Whether to pursue science is another. Only 
philosophy can answer these questions . Philosophy is just that part of rationality that 
selects the basic assumptions we use to guide our lives. Philosophy's foundations arc 
themselves without foundations. That's why philosophical choices even in the fields of 
ontology and epistemology always have the character of ethical choices. Can my choice of 
the defining constraints of rationality themselves be rational? They are like Wiredu's 
"social ideals." These are the foundational principles of a society. Choices of social ideals 
are "neither scientific nor unscientific, rational nor irrational" (Wiredu 1 997: 143). 
As foundational principles, the defining constraints of rationality are postulated as 
starting principles; we can't assign the same status to them as the deliberations that rest 
upon them. They're like the definitions and axioms that produce theorems in geometry­
simply not susceptible to proof within the system. One cannot prove that Euclid's parallel 
line postulate-given a point outside a straight line, only one line can be drawn through 
that point parallel to the straight line-is better than its competitors. Why not assume 
Lobachevski 's infinite number of parallel lines? Or Riemann's  null set of parallel lines? 
One cannot prove that a life with science in its current teclmological expressions is better 
than a life without science. If one valued survival over manipulation of the environn1ent, 
and one could prove that the contemporary expressions of science will terminate life on 
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earth as we know it, one could prove that a life without science is far better than a life with 
science. 
Do we have a choice in the matter of such foundational myths? Previously, no. 
Natural selection dictated our choices. After 911 1  we should be clear that a small group can 
exercise enormous destructive power. In a few years the development of biological and 
chemical weapons of mass destruction may allow small groups to terminate human life 
altogether. For the first time in history, humans can now exercise a choice about whether 
we should "choose to keep on choosing" or to commit speciescide. To that end, we need a 
full complement of philosophies to stimulate our imaginations about what life is and how 
we should live it. 
Messay's Proposals for Philosophy in Africa Now 
Messay's review of Africana philosophy in Africa 's Quest for a Philosophy of 
Decolonization is comprehensive and incisive. His critique covers a full spectrum, from 
Marcien Towa's dismissal of attempts to look for that philosophy in Africa herself, to 
Senghor and Diop's discovery of that philosophy in Africa and Africa alone. He resists 
Towa's claim that an assuredly pre-existing African philosophy "need not be recovered for 
the simple reason that it was utterly worthless" (Messay 2004:88). He is sensitive to 
Mudimbe's contention that scholarship on AfTica to date has produced only an "invention" 
of Africa, one that has mythical rather than rational qualities (ibid. :20). Messay recognizes 
that philosophical research cannot reproduce original African philosophies that might 
contain the seeds of African renewal. He applauds Hountondji's insistence that an 
"ethnophilosophy" that serves merely anthropological purposes is useless for the purposes 
of decolonization (ibid. :87). In this vein he finds Nkrumah and Nyerere's discoveries of an 
original African socialism to be instruments for African political leaders' successful 
recolonization of Africa-with oligarchy parading as socialism (ibid. : 1 62-1 69) . 
. Messay singles out Oruka's demand for a h'ansition from "ethnophi10sophy" to "sage 
philosophy" as particularly problematic (ibid. :9 1 -94). The critical function of the latter 
attempts to save philosophy from becoming a disguised version of anthropology but in the 
process accepts the idea that philosophical sages are exceptions to the mythical norm of 
"primitive" AfTican thought. Sage philosophy cannot generate a myth capable of 
decolonizing Africa. 
Particularly appealing to Messay is Appiah's claim that an authentic African identity 
can emerge only from a choice (ibid. : 1 38-141) .  Identities claiming their heritage in 
historical or material determinism can only be false. Appiah singles out Senghor and Diop 
for particular criticism. Accepting the European characterization of Africans as emotional 
rather than rational, Senghor celebrates African empathy with nature and emotional artistic 
expression. Diop finds black Africans to be the architects of the glorious ancient Egyptian 
culture, and discovers geographical reasons why Africans have virtues like communalism 
that escape traditional European cultures. 
Messay capitalizes on Appiah's emphasis on choice of identity to modify Senghor and 
Diop's "galvanizing myths." If the African celebration of emotion is the product of choice 
rather than genetic determinism, then Senghor's negritude may be rehabilitated. However, 
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Messay rejects Senghor's vision of complementarity between Africa and Europe. In 
mythical if not mystical language, he accuses negritude of "failing to foster a demiurgical 
orientation from the bosom of negritude itself' (ibid. :2 19) .  
The myth appropriate t o  African decolonization must be rooted i n  Africa herself, even 
if European refinements of rationality will be the technical instruments of decolonization. 
Senghor's acceptance of a "descriptive [scientific] racially determined notion of negritude, 
instead of a freely createc} one" vitiated the movement. Because Senghor succumbed to 
determinism, he could not change the African past into a viable future: "rewriting ... the past 
in light of present ambitions is how an unfolding subject endowed with a sense of mission 
moves toward a concocted future" (ibid. :220) . The mission is the myth. And the myth, 
having only the status of a likely story, must be freely chosen. 
For Messay, Diop 's myth is no more successful than Senghor's. However, his myth 
changed "Egyptian pyramids into Negro testimonies." His inspiration, like all Afrocentric 
theories, demands "something higher than the mere removal of oppression" (ibid. : 2 19) .  
Nevertheless, Diop's myth, like Senghor's, is a product of ethnophilosophy. I t  cannot 
stand without Messay's revision which is the product of his own highly critical philosophy. 
Messay's desired myth assumes messianic proportions: "In claiming what the West 
despises, Africans redefine themselves as negativity, as the antithetical subjectivity intent 
on recreating humanity by the insertion of values and beliefs extracted from the experience 
of negativity" (ibid. :2 1 2) .  He compares Africans in their quest for a decolonizing myth to 
Christians who created a new model of what it is to be human by "valorizing the poor and 
weak" (ibid.) .  The next section will consider whether indigenous African philosophies, 
critical in their own right, have a better chance of producing a "galvanizing myth" for 
African decolonization than Messay. 
From Ethnophilosophy to S age Philosophy in Ethiopia 
Messay makes an impassioned plea for a "galvanizing" myth that can pull Africa out of its 
slough of despond. Such a myth, he asserts, should come from a "re-creation" of 
traditional African grounding myths. This recreation will not resuscitate traditional African 
ways of life-it simply hasn't the power. His primary candidates for this myth are a 
"deracialized" Negritude and Afrocentrism. Africans have something unique to offer the 
world not because of their imagined race but because of their choices. 
Messay' s own myth about a galvanizing myth is laudable, but his method short­
circuits the work that needs to be done to produce this "galvanizing" myth. Negritude and 
Afrocentrism are as limiting as Nkrumah and Nyerere's traditional African socialism. Are 
bettcr models possible? A promising solution is to apply Odera Oruka's methodology for 
sage philosophy to Claude Sunmer's research in Oromo philosophy in Ethiopia. 
Oruka's method separates ethnophilosophy from sage philosophy. The former reports 
on worldviews while the latter presents philosophy in action. The test of a sage 
philosopher is to be found in rationality. Is the philosopher self-consciously critical of 
customary beliefs? Does the sage philosopher propose modifications or substitutions? Is 
the philosopher capable of specifying the reasons underlying his or her critique? Oruka's 
model searches for rational criticism by means of dialogical interviews.  Oruka's research 
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has established a method for separating anthropological recording of worldviews from 
critical reflection on and revision of those views ( 1 990, 1 99 1 ,  1 994) . 
Sumner has produced three volumes of what he calls Oromo "sapiential literature" (Sumner 
1995 :23). His method relies on anthropological fieldwork that produced written 
transcriptions of Oromo songs, proverbs, and folktales translated into German, Italian, and 
English as well as Amharic transcription. With the help of anthropologists and linguists 
fluent in Oromo dialects, he produced English translations of the material under the title of 
Oromo "wisdom literature" (Sumner 1 995, 1 996a, 1 996b). In his view, his work is not a 
mere recording of worldviews, an ethnophilosophy, but an expression of living Oromo 
wisdom. 
Interestingly, Sumner relied heavily in his research on Oromo informants, including 
Gemetchu Megerssa, who both checked Sumner's translations and translated original 
tmnscriptions into English (Sumner 1 995:5, 6, 9). Sumner's collaborative research 
methodology coincides with a paradigm proposed more than half a century ago by African 
American philosopher Alain Locke. Locke suggested that philosophers cannot do their 
work without assistance from the social sciences, especially sociology, psychology, and 
anthropology, partiCUlarly in the field of ethics (Locke 1 989). 
My proposal for the practice of sage philosophy in Ethiopia is to systematically 
combine the methods of Oruka and Sumner. Their combined virtue is to insist on the 
separation of ethnophilosophy and sage philosophy. Sumner's particular virtue was to 
enlist the aid of linguists and anthropologists in presenting the raw material of Oromo 
philosophy. 
Sumner's assistant, Gemetchu Megerssa, was encouraged to pursue Oromo 
anthroplogy by Lambert Bartels. Bartels was a missionary in Ethiopia who was inspired by 
his own natural inclination and the Second Vatican Council to apply techniques of "mutual 
inculturation" to his work with the Oromo in Ethiopia (Tablino 2005 :37). His guiding idea 
was that the Oromo practice of the Catholic faith should be an expression of their own 
cultural foundations. Gemetchu was the grandson of the last gada (generation-graded 
socio-political structuIe) leader in the Macca (also spelled "Matcha"), the Westernmost 
Oromo group in Ethiopia. In addition to assisting Sumner, he subsequently co-authored a 
paper with Bartels and went on to write his Ph.D. dissertation on the Oromo at the 
University of London. 
With the help of Gemetchu, Bartels developed a profile of Oromo religion to discover 
"through sincere and patient dialogue . . .  the riches which the generous God has distributed 
among the nations" (Bartels quoted in Tablino, ibid.) Their method included "listening to 
what the Oromo people themselves have to say" in order to "allow the people to speak for 
themselves." For example, Bartels refused to characterize the supreme Oromo divinity, 
Waaqa. as omniscient or omnipresent to avoid "hellenizing" the concept (Baxter and 
Kassan, 2005 :5).  Ironically, one commentator calls Bartels a "Socrates among the Oromo" 
who sought as a philosopher "to discover the Oromo vision of the universe, of God, of 
man, of life, and of things" (Tablino 2005 :37). 
Bartels' "philosophical" method has several limitations. In the later part of his life he 
speculated that the "Oromo religious concepts might have a Hindu Indian origin" (Baxter 
and Kassam, 2005 :4). The Oromo cosmology is much closer to that of ancient Egypt than 
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that of ancient India. Water plays a crucial role in both ancient Egyptian and Oromo 
cosmologies (Hornung 1 990, Megerssa 1 983) and no role whatsoever in the Hindu creation 
myths. Equally plausible speCUlation could suggest that Oromo beliefs were influenced by 
Egypt through Red Sea trade routes south to the land of Punt. And nothing prevents further 
speculation that Oromo or other Cushitic cultures may have had an impact on ancient 
Egyptian culture. 
A second limitation of Bartels' work is that he did not systematize the various aspects 
of Oromo thought into a� organized whole. Gemetchu undertook this task in his Ph.D. 
dissertation, "Knowledge, Identity and the Colonizing Structure: The Case of the Oromo of 
East and Northeast Africa" (Baxter and Kassam:S). A third limitation is that Bartels did 
not look for the model of rationality that produced Oromo philosophy. A perfect example 
of sage philosophy in action would be to engage the Oromo in a dialogue about the wisdom 
of modifying Oromo philosophy to conform to Christian doctrine. 
The limitations of Bartels' model are easily corrected by including ethnographers pas 
well as philosophers on sage philosophy research teams. Sumner began to put this model 
into practice through his collaboration with linguists and anthropologists. However, he did 
not capitalize on Oruka's insistence that dialogue grounded in rationality be the method of 
sage philosophical research. From his part, however, Oruka did not rely on the services of 
professional linguists and anthropologists. 
My proposed new model for sage philosophy research teams would bring 
anthropologists and philosophers together. The methodology of these teams would include 
two phases that would be interwoven with one another. The first phase is a systematic, in­
depth, dialogical (or polylogical-see Gutema 2004) exploration of informants' answers to 
four basic philosophical questions corresponding to four areas of philosophy-ontology, 
epistemology, axiology, and praxiology. The four questions include "what exists," "how 
can that be known," "what is the value of what exists," and "how may the theoretical 
beliefs comprising the answers to these three questions be put into practice." The dialogue 
should include the informants, an anthropologist fluent in their language and tTained in 
ethnography, as well as a philosopher. The informants should include not only individuals 
qualifying as sage philosophers, but other members of the community. This aspect of the 
fieldwork is important because of the need to distinguish between sage philosophers ' views 
and those of their community members. Oruka points out that philosophical sages "act like 
a gadfly" for their communities and "sometimes the community rebels against them, and 
then they become very lonely" (Oruka 1 997:253). Or dead-shades of Socrates! 
Interpreting the Borana people of the Oromo group, the Ethiopian anthropologist 
Sahlu Kidane points out that "most" of the questions asked by anthropologists about 
interpretations of cultural narratives "tum out to be something the people have never 
thought about before." Even though the people "perform" the narratives, "they do not 
often make critical examinations [of them]." Often the performers are "unconscious of 
some of their attitudes and practices" (Kidane 2002:73). The problems confronting sage 
philosophy teams will be complex. 
The second phase of the revised method includes a systematic, in-depth exploration of 
the informants' pursuit of rationality, with emphasis on the hyper-reflexive function of 
philosophy. The dialogue should make extensive use of the seven promptings of rationality 
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outlined above in section three. The task here is to determine whether the informants are 
aware of alternatives to their answers to the four basic questions, and to see whether they 
provide rational reasons for their choices. Including a broad range of community members 
in the dialogue together with candidates for sage philosophy will help show whether my 
proposed model of rationality is indeed at work in the community. The model of rationality 
I sketched in the second section of the essay is tentative at best. The best outcome of sage 
philosophy research team dialogues would show that alternative models to my proposal of 
rationality are required. An example of such a model emerging from African culture is the 
ancient Egyptian postulation of a multi-valued logic, as described by Eric Hornung in his 
Conceptions of God in Ancient Egypt: The One and the Many (see also Hornung 1982). 
My brief sketch assumes that the principle of non-contradiction is clear and compelling. 
Hornung's research suggests that the ancient Egyptian understanding of the principle is at 
once more complex and more practical than our own. 
What is the compelling motive for pursuing sage philosophy in Ethiopia? One reason 
is to test Diop's hypothesis of cultural transmission from ancient Egypt to other parts of 
Africa and its converse. A second reason springs from the fact that culture is preserved not 
only by means of language but also by philosophy. Cultures are being lost at the same rate 
as languages. Globalization may reduce the world's  6,000 or so languages to 2,000 within 
fifty years. Wiredu proposes retaining cultures' philosophical cores even while 
contemporary science and technology transform their accidental features (cited in Messay 
2004 : 1 1 6). To discover a culture 's deepest foundations through sage philosophy increases 
the chance of cultural survival. 
A third reason for pursuing sage philosophy in Ethiopia lies in the fact that a 
philosophy is a work of art-in the senses of both practical and fine art. A culture survives 
in part through the execution of its philosophical guidelines; a culture ' s  philosophy is part 
of its proven technology for survival. And philosophies, by reason of their high degrees of 
generalization and expression through minimalist sets of symbols, are beautiful by reason 
of their economy and simplicity. A fourth reason to keep these philosophical works of art 
alive is to discover the collective past of humanity, and to stimulate further creativity in the 
world' s  collective philosophy. A fifth reason is the longest stretch--to hope to find a 
galvanizing myth with filiations throughout a large number of African cultures (Verharen 
1 998) .  My tentative hypothesis is that ancient Egyptian holism may be widely reflected 
across Africa. 
Where in Africa will Messay's galvanizing myth come from? Messay headed in the 
right direction by singling out Cheikh Anta Diop for attention. However, by focusing on 
Diop's  claim that black Africans built the pyramids, Messay missed Diop's deeper message 
for African unification . .  Diop holds that ancient Egypt is the key to a future African 
renaissance in the same way that Greece was critical to the European renaissance (Diop 
1 99 1 ;  see Verharen 2006, 1997a). Debate continues to rage over Diop's argument that 
ancient Egyptian philosophy launched Greek philosophy. But Diop's galvanizing myth for 
African unity "looks back to take the past" in the manner of Ghana's Sankofa bird-the 
point of looking back is to create the future. Africa's historical impact on Europe tlu'ough 
Greece is irrelevant to her constitution of the future. Diop's  vision of an African future 
springs from his conviction that ancient Egypt is a reflection of a much wider African 
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cultural heritage based on cultural exchange throughout Africa, from northern to southern 
Africa and back again. Theodore Celenko's (1996) extraordinary Egypt in Aji-ica is the 
most forceful exhibition of ancient Egyptian links to a wider Africa. 
A Research Program: Toward a Galvanizing Myth 
My proposal is to attempt to unearth filiations among the Oromo peoples, the Cushite I 
empire, gnosticism, and ancient Egypt (Assman 1998, Hornung 2001). My research model 
is the reverse of Sumner's method. He started with the written exogenous sources of 
Ethiopian philosophy. He calls his method an "outside-in" method. His research finishes 
with three volumes on endogenous Ethiopian philosophy. I suggest that we start with 
Oromo fieldwork done according to a revised Sumner/Oruka methodology, then work 
outward through written texts and orature to wider Africa. The hope is to fmd extensive 
filiations of Ethiopian philosophy with other African philosophies. A fertile ground for 
research outside Ethiopia would be the extensive texts from the university of Sankore in 
Timbuktu in Mali. Henry Louis Gates, Jr. has spun-ed efforts toward preserving and 
disseminating these writings. 
One hypothesis is that modem Oromo cultures are an expression of wider Cushitic 
cultures that extended from Africa to India, with connections to ancient Egypt (Gemetchu 
1993). The importance of water in Oromo cultures may be connected to the ancient 
Egyptian cosmology of the universe in a watery chaotic first principle. Water is the first 
principle of Egyptian cosmology but the second principle of Oromo cosmology. The 
Oromo sky God Waaqa creates the universe out of a pre-existing water called Wallaabu 
(Megerssa 1993:8). However, Waaqa may be the Oromo sky God not in any literal sense 
but in the sense of a sky that is the beyond of beyond, itself perfectly beyond our 
comprehension. The ancient Egyptian first principle of Nun is analogous to water, revered 
as the origin of the universe, and incomprehensible as well (Hornung 1990). I am not 
making any claims about cultural diffusion between ancient Egypt and Oromo cultures, but 
merely proposing research hypotheses. 
To end on a personal note, what is my own galvanizing myth (Verharen 2001 , 2002)? 
I 'm searching for better stories to tell ourselves than the European philosophical stories that 
have yielded potential nuclear and environmental catastrophe. Stories that do not end with 
billions of humans barely surviving, unable to satisfy their needs on the land, forced to 
migrate to large cities like Lagos and Mexico City to lead lives of unquiet desperation. 
And my desired myth is much more ambitious than Diop's .  His Civilization or 
Barbarism sought a galvanizing principle so that African civilization could stand against 
the European-style barbarism that began with African enslavement and colonization and 
continues with rampant globalization. My hope is that a research program in African sage 
philosophy might help yield a network of holistic philosophies that the whole earth could 
use as a galvanizing myth against its own destruction (Verharen, 2003). 
Can a modified sage philosophy help deliver Messay's galvanizing myth? Philosophy 
may be epiphenomenal, the equivalent of ideology, as Engels suggests: "ideology is a 
process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, it is true, but with a false 
consciousness. The real motive forces compelling him remain unknown to him ... " (Engels 
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quoted in Messay 2004: 1 0) .  For Engels, freedom is going to have its way with the world 
whether we help it along or not. 
Philosophy may have no practical effect on the course of the world. But we do make 
use of decision trees to guide our lives: "If I want this, then I have to do that. "  Careful 
scrutiny of the foundational and guiding principles of these trees may lead to their revision, 
especially when a crisis threatens and we have a motive to change our behavior such as we 
have never had before. As I said above, 911 1  reminds us that a small group can cause 
enormous destruction. We now face a crisis unprecedented in human history. The 
exponential growth of technology may make it possible in the near future for small groups 
to destroy all human life .  We now have a motive to discover or recover philosophies that 
encourage us, in the words of Rodney King, to "all get along." 
Speaking of "the new world and the dreams to which it may give rise," Hegel hypothesized 
that freedom would achieve its apotheosis in the Americas, perhaps as a result of a contest 
between North and South America (Hegel 1956:87,  86; see Verharen 1 997b). Cuba 
spearheads that "contest" now, j oined by Venezuela, Bolivia, and other Latin American 
countries. However, a larger contest between the Global North and South might produce a 
freedom that Hegel could not imagine. What a delicious irony if a galvanizing myth for 
such a freedom were to come out of the exercise of sage philosophy in Africa-the 
continent, according to Hegel, with no history, the continent saturated in savagery and 
myth. 
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